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MINING FOR MANNY:  
ELECTRONIC SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN THE 
AFTERMATH OF UNITED STATES V. 
COMPREHENSIVE DRUG TESTING 
Kimberly Nakamaru* 
As a part of a federal investigation of the Bay Area Lab Cooperative 
(BALCO) for allegedly providing illegal steroids to professional 
baseball players, the U.S. government received a warrant to search 
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc.’s computers that contained 
confidential test results of ten players who they had probable cause to 
believe received steroids from BALCO. In 2010, the Ninth Circuit 
majority in United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. held that 
the government executed an unconstitutional “dragnet” search by 
examining the entire computer directory containing the test results of 
all professional athletes rather than just the records of those players for 
whom the government had probable cause. Furthermore, Chief Judge 
Alex Kozinski, in what previously appeared in the 2009 Ninth Circuit 
majority opinion but is now in the 2010 concurrence, provided 
guidelines regarding how to conduct a lawful electronic search and 
seizure. This Note suggests that even though Kozinski’s guidelines 
cannot technically constitute an advisory opinion because they are no 
longer binding Ninth Circuit law, they will likely have the same effect 
because they will still “advise” future legal actors’ actions. 
Additionally, this Note argues that new legislation is necessary to strike 
the best balance between the government’s interest in law enforcement 
and the right of the individual to be free from unreasonable search and 
seizure in the digital realm. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Baseball players are lying. Cooperstown is crying. The 
government is prying? On September 13, 2010, in United States v. 
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (Comprehensive Drug Testing 
IV), 1 a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling sent shockwaves 
through Major League Baseball: the names of 104 players who tested 
positive for steroids in 2003 should never have been seized in the 
first place. 
While most members of the American public are acutely aware 
of the ignominiously public downfall of Alex Rodriguez, David 
Ortiz, and Manny Ramirez, very few realize that these and hundreds 
of other professional baseball players were promised that their test 
results would remain confidential pursuant to an agreement between 
Major League Baseball (MLB) and the Major League Baseball 
Players Association (“Players Association”). According to the 
agreement, the tests were to only serve as a generalized gauge of the 
extent of the steroid problem in professional baseball. 
Enter Barry Bonds. As part of a federal investigation of the Bay 
Area Lab Cooperative (BALCO) for allegedly providing illegal 
steroids to professional baseball players, the government received a 
warrant to search computers containing records of the confidential 
test results of ten players (Bonds being one) who they had probable 
cause to believe received steroids from BALCO. Fine. Legal. Where 
the government went wrong, according to the Ninth Circuit, 
however, was in searching and seizing the entire computer directory 
containing the test results of all professional athletes (baseball and 
non-baseball) rather than just the records of those players for whom 
the government had probable cause. 
An unconstitutional “dragnet” seizure as the Ninth Circuit 
decried? Or a practical necessity? The problem hinges on the fact 
that the ten players’ records were intermingled with hundreds of 
other athletes’ records contained in a computer file called the 
“Tracey Directory.” Indeed, data stored on electronic storage devices 
such as computer hard drives present a unique dilemma for the 
courts: how should digital data—specifically, intermingled digital 
data—be treated for Fourth Amendment purposes? The resolution of 
this issue affects everyone who has personal data stored on electronic 
 
 1. 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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devices. Can the government seize your private medical records if it 
has probable cause to seize another patient’s records? What about 
financial information? Personal e-mails? 
Case law is flush with concrete rules governing searches and 
seizures of tangible objects in the physical realm, but this Note 
contends that such rules are attenuated and outdated when applied to 
the digital world. Computers are not like file cabinets; rifling through 
physical files is not like digitally searching computer files. Part II of 
this Note examines the history of Fourth Amendment search and 
seizure doctrine and compares physical and digital2 search and 
seizure law. Next, it addresses the problem of intermingled physical 
documents as resolved by United States v. Tamura, 3 and explores the 
various approaches that courts have taken with respect to 
intermingled digital documents. Part III provides an in-depth 
description of the Comprehensive Drug Testing IV opinion. Part IV 
critiques Comprehensive Drug Testing IV and suggests that Chief 
Judge Kozinski cleverly issued the equivalent of an unconstitutional 
advisory opinion in his concurrence by suggesting guidelines for 
magistrates to follow when dealing with intermingled digital 
documents on electronic storage devices. Finally, in Part V, this Note 
recommends that a legislative solution would enable Congress to 
genuinely federalize privacy expectations and maintain a balance 
between federal and state power that favors the individual. 
II.  STATEMENT OF EXISTING LAW 
A.  History of Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure Doctrine 
In order to understand the rules governing computer search and 
seizure, it is necessary to first have a basic understanding of the 
relevant Fourth Amendment history. The Fourth Amendment’s 
origin can be traced to eighteenth-century England and colonial 
America when general warrants were used to search private homes 
for evidence of any crime.4 
 
 2. This Note uses the term “digital search and seizure law” interchangeably with the terms 
“computer search and seizure law” and “electronic search and seizure law.” Likewise, the term 
“digital search” is used interchangeably with the terms “computer search” and “electronic 
search.” 
 3. 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 4. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 536 
(2005); see generally NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH 
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Specifically, the English government commonly used general 
warrants to ransack citizens’ homes and seize political materials that 
could allegedly be used to undermine the government. 5 In addition to 
seizing the allegedly libelous material, the government also 
indiscriminately removed private papers from private homes.6 Early 
courts were particularly troubled by the seizure of private papers, 
prompting Lord Camden, in Entick v. Carrington, 7 to famously 
explain that “[p]apers are the owner’s goods and chattels: they are 
his dearest property; and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they 
will hardly bear an inspection.”8 Accordingly, one of the Fourth 
Amendment’s original aims was to keep the government’s sticky 
fingers away from citizens’ private materials—materials that 
innocent people would want to keep secret, materials that would 
embarrass the citizen but would not be illegal to possess.9 
In reaction to these privacy breaches and dragnet searches, the 
Framers enacted the Fourth Amendment to ensure that the new 
federal government lacked the power to execute such sweeping 
searches. 10 Accordingly, the Framers prohibited general warrants, 
meaning that “every search or seizure had to be reasonable, and a 
warrant could issue under the Fourth Amendment only if it 
particularly described the place to be searched and the person or 
thing to be seized.” 11 Based on this history and on the textual 
 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 79–105 (1937) (discussing the 
development of the Fourth Amendment from the Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776 to the adoption 
of the Fourth Amendment). 
 5. See Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.); 19 How. St. Tr. 1030; Wilkes 
v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.); 19 How. St. Tr. 1153. 
 6. Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 818; 19 How. St. Tr. at 1066. 
 7. 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.); 19 How. St. Tr. 1030. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 
393, 402 (1995) (discussing how in the Entick and Wilkes cases the emphasis was on the private 
nature of an individual’s papers). The protection of private information that is embarrassing but 
not illegal is relevant in the computer data context as well. Take the BALCO steroid scandal, for 
example. What if the records that the government seized dated back to 1989, before the Anabolic 
Steroids Control Act criminalized steroid use? Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 1990, H.R. 4658, 
101st Cong. (2d Sess. 1990). Or, what if a person took human growth hormone (HGH) within the 
confines of a doctor-patient relationship but in contravention of a professional sports league 
policy? Such private and potentially humiliating material fits within the Framers’ rationale for 
enacting the Fourth Amendment just as much as incendiary pamphlets criticizing the Crown did 
in the eighteenth century. 
 10. LASSON, supra note 4, at 94–95; Kerr, supra note 4, at 536. 
 11. Kerr, supra note 4, at 536 (emphasis added); see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
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requirement that searches and seizures be “reasonable,” the U.S. 
Supreme Court has created a set of rules that balances the needs of 
law enforcement with the individual’s interest in deterring abusive 
law enforcement practices. 12 
B.  Physical Search and Seizure 
Since the Fourth Amendment’s enactment, the search of a home 
has been the archetypal scenario in a search and seizure case. 13 The 
rules of such a search are well settled. 14 The police lawfully may 
enter a home if they have a warrant or an exception to the warrant 
requirement exists. Absent these circumstances, the police’s entrance 
into the house constitutes an unlawful search 15 that violates the 
inhabitants’ reasonable expectation of privacy. 16 Once the police 
have lawfully entered, they can walk around any open spaces. 17 
However, opening drawers or moving items triggers a new search 
that requires a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement. 18 
Additionally, the police can take away, or seize, any evidence 
described in the warrant. 19 According to the Supreme Court, an 
unlawful seizure occurs when the government meaningfully 
interferes with an individual’s possessory interest in property. 20 
However, the seizing of physical evidence is considered 
 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the 
person or things to be seized.”). 
 12. Kerr, supra note 4, at 536; see William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, 
and the Fourth Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 553, 561–62 (1992). 
 13. See United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (“[P]hysical 
entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is 
directed . . . .”). 
 14. Kerr, supra note 4, at 536. 
 15. Smith v. Maryland created a two-pronged “reasonable expectation of privacy test” for 
whether an unlawful Fourth Amendment search has occurred: (1) whether the individual by his 
conduct has “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy,” and (2) whether the 
individual’s subjective expectation of privacy is “one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’” 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). 
 16. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32–33 (2001). 
 17. Cf. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985) (stating that the police officer’s 
examination of items that were “intentionally exposed to all who frequent the place of business” 
did not trigger a search). 
 18. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987). 
 19. Kerr, supra note 4, at 537. 
 20. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). 
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“reasonable” if the property is listed in the warrant. 21 The police can 
also remove other evidence that they come across in “plain view,” 22 
provided that the incriminating nature of the evidence is 
“immediately apparent.” 23 
C.  Plain View Doctrine 
Unlike other exceptions to the warrant requirement, the plain 
view doctrine only permits a warrantless seizure—not a warrantless 
search. 24 The landmark case Horton v. California 25 exemplifies a 
typical plain view scenario. In Horton, the defendant used a gun to 
rob the victim of jewelry and cash. 26 Accordingly, a police officer 
obtained a warrant to search the defendant’s home for the stolen 
jewelry and cash. 27 During the search, however, the officer saw 
weapons in plain view and seized them. 28 The Supreme Court found 
that, despite not being specified in the warrant, the trial court 
properly admitted the weapons into evidence. 29 
In so holding, the Supreme Court clarified that the requirements 
of a lawful plain view seizure are that (1) the officer did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment in arriving at the place from which the 
evidence could be plainly viewed; 30 (2) the officer had a “lawful 
right of access to the object itself”; 31 and (3) the incriminating nature 
of the evidence was “immediately apparent.” 32 
 One major policy concern that the plain view doctrine addresses 
is the risk of evidence destruction. 33 Under the facts of Horton, this 
 
 21. Id. at 113–14. 
 22. The term “plain view” means “open and visible to the naked eye.” People v. Nickles, 88 
Cal. Rptr. 763, 767 (Ct. App. 1970). 
 23. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136 (1990) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
403 U.S. 443, 446 (1971)). 
 24. Id. at 133–34. 
 25. 496 U.S. 128.  
 26. Id. at 130. 
 27. Id. at 130–31. 
 28. Id. at 131. 
 29. Id. at 142. 
 30. Id. at 141. 
 31. Id. at 137. In other words, the item allegedly in plain view was observed while the 
officer was confining her activities to the permissible scope of the intrusion itself. 
 32. Id. at 136. 
 33. See, e.g., Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 780 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466–67 (1971). 
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issue could have arisen had the police officer been required to return 
to the magistrate for a new warrant that allowed him to seize guns. 
During “the delay inherent in obtaining a warrant,” an accused can 
easily hide, destroy, or, as argued in digital evidence cases, encrypt 
or booby-trap the evidence. 34 Returning to the magistrate not only 
jeopardizes the integrity of the evidence but also is inefficient. 35 
Whether these overall policy aims are as gravely at issue in a plain 
view seizure of computer files is the subject of a new and ongoing 
debate that is colored, in large part, by the differences between 
physical and digital data. 
D.  Digital Search and Seizure 
Application of the plain view doctrine and Fourth Amendment 
search and seizure law is problematic when it involves data stored on 
computers. Because Fourth Amendment search and seizure law 
evolved vis-à-vis physical spaces, such as buildings and file cabinets, 
the extent to which this physical framework fits the digital arena is 
unsettled. This issue comes into sharper relief with regard to whether 
government officials may search and seize “intermingled” digital 
documents: “documents that are outside the scope of a search 
warrant, but so intermingled with materials specified in the warrant 
that on-site separation would be impractical.” 36 
1.  Differences Between Physical and Computer Searches 
Physical search and seizure is quite similar to computer search 
and seizure: in both instances, government officials attempt to locate 
and retrieve germane information hidden inside a closed canister. 37 
However, the physical search and seizure procedures, which focus on 
entering and taking tangible evidence, are considerably different 
from computer search and seizure procedures, which function by 
locating and copying data. 38 
 
 34. Andreas, 463 U.S. at 780. 
 35. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 327 (1987). 
 36. Aaron Seiji Lowenstein, Search and Seizure on Steroids: United States v. 
Comprehensive Drug Testing and Its Consequences for Private Information Stored on 
Commercial Electronic Databases, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 101, 104 (2007). 
 37. Kerr, supra note 4, at 538. 
 38. Id. at 537. 
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In his well-known article Searches and Seizures in a Digital 
World, Professor Orin Kerr elucidates the key differences between 
physical and computer search and seizure methods. 39 To start, the 
method that government officials use to obtain information in these 
two scenarios is different. As previously mentioned, a physical space 
is traditionally searched by an official who enters a room or vehicle, 
opens drawers and containers, and looks around. 40 On the other hand, 
an agent cannot physically enter a computer to extract the desired 
data; he must type commands that signal the computer to access 
data 41 on the hard drive before the data becomes visible on an output 
device such as a monitor. 42 The difference is fundamental. 
Second, where a physical search and seizure traditionally 
involves an agent entering a home and taking evidence, its digital 
corollary does not require any physical movement of evidence. 
Rather, in order to preserve the integrity of the original evidence, the 
agent or computer forensics expert makes an exact copy of the data 
and performs any analysis on the data copy on a government 
computer. 43 Whether copying data constitutes a Fourth Amendment 
seizure is undecided 44 and raises significant legal issues: Is this a 
 
 39. See id. at 538–47. 
 40. See supra Part II.B. 
 41. Furthermore, data on a computer storage device are intangible—every letter, number, or 
symbol is composed of a string of eight zeros and ones called a “byte” of information. See Kerr, 
supra note 4, at 538–39. 
 42. See id. at 539. 
 43. Id. at 540 (citing BILL NELSON ET AL., GUIDE TO COMPUTER FORENSICS AND 
INVESTIGATIONS 51 (2004)). 
 44. Compare Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 323–24 (1987) (finding that a police officer 
writing down the serial number of a suspected stolen stereo did not constitute an illegal seizure of 
the serial number but also finding that the officer’s movement of the stereo did constitute an 
illegal search), and Bills v. Aseltine, 958 F.2d 697, 707 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that the 
recording of visual images of a scene by means of photography does not constitute an unlawful 
seizure), with Comprehensive Drug Testing IV, 621 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2010) (assuming 
that copying digital data unlawfully seizes it by repeatedly characterizing the data as “seized 
data”). 
  In his 2010 article, Kerr makes a critical distinction between copying serial numbers and 
taking photographs, and copying computer data: “Writing down information or taking a 
photograph merely preserves the human observation in fixed form[, whereas] electronic copying 
adds to the information in the government’s possession by copying that which the government 
has not observed.” Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Seizures of Computer Data, 119 YALE L.J. 
700, 714 (2010). Whether something constitutes an unlawful seizure, then, depends on whether 
the information has been first exposed to human observation..Accordingly, Kerr believes that 
copying serial numbers and taking photographs should not be considered a seizure while copying 
data for later observation should be. Id. As discussed in Part V, this distinction makes a plain 
view doctrine tailored to digital evidence cases (or even better, a statute codifying this distinction) 
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seizure of the original data? Can the government freely peruse its 
own copy? Is that a reasonable search? 45 
Third, the scope of computer searches is much greater than that 
of physical searches due to computers’ vast storage space. 46 Whereas 
physical searches are limited by the confines of the room, vehicle, or 
file cabinet to be searched, a search of a hard drive of a typical one-
hundred-gigabyte home computer can implicate the equivalent of 
fifty million typed pages. 47 
Accordingly, the sheer amount of data involved illustrates that 
electronic data seizure fits within the original policy aims of the plain 
view doctrine: to mitigate the risk of evidence destruction and to 
spare the government the “inconvenience . . . of going to obtain a 
warrant” every time it wishes to seize potentially incriminating 
material. 48 If the government is inconvenienced by returning to the 
magistrate for a warrant to search and seize one thousand pages, the 
government will certainly be aggravated by a digital search involving 
the equivalent of fifty million pages that could disappear in the 
stroke of a key. In other words, the risky and procedurally 
cumbersome process of returning to the magistrate is exacerbated by 
the volume of data in cases involving digital data. 
Additionally, the intangible nature 49 of computer data in 
conjunction with the vast storage capacity of modern computers 
“creates a high risk of overbroad, wide-ranging searches and 
seizures.” 50 Furthermore, a potentially overbroad search directly 
conflicts with the fundamental Fourth Amendment principle that 
government officials not conduct “general” searches and that 
 
necessary because, otherwise, copying digital information will be deemed an unlawful seizure in 
jurisdictions that adopt Kerr’s proposal. 
 45. Kerr, supra note 4, at 541; Lowenstein, supra note 36, at 104. 
 46. Lowenstein, supra note 36, at 105. 
 47. Id. (referring to Nathan Drew Larsen, Evaluating the Proposed Changes to Rule 37: 
Spoliation, Routine Operation and the Rules Enabling Act, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 212, 
216 (2006) (“One gigabyte of memory space can hold the equivalent of 500,000 typed pages.”)). 
 48. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 327. 
 49. While the intangible nature of digital data makes it easier to execute an overbroad search 
in that typing commands into a computer is easier than physically seizing thousands of 
documents, the data’s intangible nature does not affect the analysis because the Supreme Court 
has recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects “intangible as well as tangible evidence.” 
Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computer and Computer Data, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
75, 81 (1994) (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 305 (1967)). 
 50. Id. at 78. 
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warrants specifically describe the places to be searched and the 
things to be seized. 51 
Finally, the technique for finding evidence and the degree of its 
invasiveness distinguish physical and computer searches and 
seizures. 52 When executing a physical search, a search team typically 
composed of trained police officers goes from room to room seeking 
the evidence described in the warrant; once the item is found, the 
search is over and the police leave. 53 Due to prohibitive costs, the 
police rarely conduct an extraordinarily extensive or thorough search 
unless the case is particularly important. 54 On the other hand, 
analysis of a single hard drive requires fewer people but can take a 
forensic analyst 55 months to complete, depending on the importance 
of the case or the nature of evidence sought. 56 
Contributing to their labor- and time-intensive nature, computer 
searches also require forensic analysts to conduct two different types 
of searches: a “logical,” or “virtual,” level search and a “physical” 
level search. 57 A logical search examines a hard drive’s file system 
for certain file extensions, such as “.jpg.” 58 Because it is easy to 
change the file extension, a “physical” level search is necessary to 
capture any data not gathered from the logical search. A physical 
search recovers data by searching for file headers—difficult-to-alter 
segments of data that tell the operating system information about the 
associated file type. 59 
Even with highly skilled forensic analysts performing 
comprehensive logical and physical searches, the targets of 
government investigations can attempt to thwart search efforts. 60 For 
example, computer owners can encrypt data, rendering it inaccessible 
 
 51. See Hayden, 387 U.S. at 301. 
 52. Kerr, supra note 4, at 543. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. 
 55. The forensic analyst makes the determination of how much time to spend on a computer 
search in conjunction with the warrant and the case agent. When conducting the search, the 
forensic analyst must keep in mind the warrant’s specifications, as well as the amount of evidence 
the government needs to prove its case. Id. at 544. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. (citing JIM KEOGH, THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO COMPUTER HARDWARE 144–46 
(2002)). 
 59. Id. at 545 (citing NELSON, supra note 43, at 493). 
 60. Lowenstein, supra note 36, at 106. 
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to anyone without a special password, or can even plant booby traps 
that destroy data if the analyst does not follow meticulous 
procedures. 61 
It has been argued that the justification for the plain view 
doctrine in physical searches—the risk of evidence being destroyed 
while government agents obtain another warrant—is not present in 
the context of digital searches because government agents remove a 
copy of the evidence from the owner’s control during typical digital 
search and seizure procedures. 62 This argument assumes, however, 
that the copying itself is not an unlawful seizure. Kerr now believes 
that it is. 63 If copying digital data is an unlawful seizure, the 
government needs the plain view doctrine for the same reason it 
needs it in physical search and seizure proceedings: efficiency and 
protection of evidence. Even though a new warrant can be granted 
within one day, one day is more than adequate time for a 
technologically savvy suspect to destroy the data. 
As has been illustrated, the analogy between physical and 
computer searches is attenuated, yet the plain view doctrine remains 
a necessity. This disharmony is further demonstrated by the central 
concern in Comprehensive Drug Testing IV: how to treat 
intermingled documents located on computer storage devices. 
2.  The Intermingled Documents Dilemma 
The problem of intermingled documents arises when the 
government seizes documents not listed in a warrant when it seizes 
documents that are. 64 This happens in one of two ways: (1) it is not 
immediately apparent to the government official that the documents 
are outside the warrant’s scope or (2) it would be too cumbersome or 
time-consuming to separate the relevant documents from the 
documents not listed in the warrant because they are so intertwined 
with each other. 65 Intermingled documents cases get litigated when 
the party aggrieved by the search and seizure of the intermingled 
 
 61. Id. (citing United States v. Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090–91 (C.D. Cal. 2004)). 
 62. Derek Regensburger, Bytes, BALCO, and Barry Bonds: An Exploration of the Law 
Concerning Search and Seizure of Computer Files and an Analysis of the Ninth Circuit’s 
Decision in United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1151, 1201 (2007). 
 63. See Kerr, supra note 44, at 714–15. 
 64. Lowenstein, supra note 36, at 106. 
 65. Id. 
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documents claims that the initial search unconstitutionally exceeded 
the warrant’s scope, and that party accordingly moves to suppress. 66 
a.  Physically intermingled documents: United States v. Tamura 
In Tamura, 67 the Ninth Circuit held that intermingled documents 
seized during a search of Mr. Tamura’s office for three specifically 
authorized categories of records constituted an “unreasonable” 68 
seizure. 69 After Mr. Tamura’s employees persistently refused to help 
the government agents locate the desired documents, the FBI seized 
eleven cardboard boxes of computer printouts, thirty-four file 
drawers of vouchers, and seventeen drawers of canceled checks and 
brought them off-site for sorting and extracting the relevant 
documents. 70 
Despite the court’s disapproval of the broad seizure, it ultimately 
denied Mr. Tamura’s motion to suppress because all of the 
documents introduced at trial were lawfully taken pursuant to the 
warrant and because the government was motivated by “practicality” 
and not by indiscriminate “fishing.” 71 Even so, the Ninth Circuit 
emphasized that the “wholesale seizure for later detailed examination 
of records not described in a warrant is significantly more intrusive, 
and has been characterized as ‘the kind of investigatory dragnet that 
the fourth amendment was designed to prevent.’” 72 In dicta, the court 
suggested that government officials can avoid running afoul of the 
Fourth Amendment by “sealing and holding the documents pending 
approval by a magistrate of a further search.” 73 
Rather than standing for a specific legal precedent, Tamura is 
widely cited for its clear facts indicating what might constitute an 
overbroad seizure and for its suggestive dicta. Twenty federal court 
 
 66. Id. at 106–07. 
 67. United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 68. Id. at 594–96. The Ninth Circuit did not use the word “unreasonable” synonymously 
with “legally unreasonable.” Rather, “unreasonable” meant that the court disagreed with, or did 
not “sanction” the government’s action, but did not intend for the action to carry the weight of 
illegality. See id. at 596–97. 
 69. Id. at 596. 
 70. Id. at 595. 
 71. Id. at 597. 
 72. Id. at 595 (second emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Abrams, 615 F.2d 541, 543 
(1st Cir. 1980)). 
 73. Id. at 595–96. 
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opinions and two state court opinions have cited the Tamura 
guidelines. 74 This widespread reliance on the Tamura guidelines 
illustrates the power of nonbinding statements of the court. This is 
important to note at this juncture because it foreshadows the effect 
that Chief Judge Kozinski’s concurring “guidelines” will likely have 
in the wake of Comprehensive Drug Testing IV. As discussed in Part 
IV below, when the court lays down guidelines, even nonbinding 
guidelines, it alerts attorneys, judges, and the FBI as to how the court 
plans to evaluate searches and seizures of intermingled documents. 
As a result, U.S. Attorneys hoping to use seized evidence, district 
judges hoping not to get reversed, and FBI agents hoping that their 
searches will stand up in court will quickly realize that they had 
better adhere to the guidelines—especially those written by the chief 
judge of the Ninth Circuit. 
b.  Digitally intermingled documents: The new frontier 
The intermingled documents problem is even more pronounced 
in the computer context because separating irrelevant files from 
those within a warrant’s scope is necessarily time-consuming and 
almost always requires that a computer forensics expert analyze the 
data off-site. 75 
Courts have had mixed reactions to digitally intermingled 
documents. On one hand, some courts have granted government 
agents broad authority to conduct sweeping computer searches, 
seemingly in reaction to the ostensible ease with which computer 
owners can hinder government searches. 76 Conversely, other courts 
have expressed concern that broad computer searches are particularly 
 
 74. See Westlaw KeyCite Result, WESTLAW, http://www.westlaw.com (search for citation 
“694 F.2d 591,” click “KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote” for Headnote “[3]”, check 
the box next to “Cases [22],” and click “Go”). A Westlaw KeyCite search for Tamura’s Headnote 
Three, 349k141k, on October 10, 2010, provided the cited statistical information. Headnote Three 
reads: “In instances where documents are so intermingled that they cannot feasibly be sorted on 
sight, government and law enforcement officials generally can avoid violating Fourth 
Amendment rights by sealing and holding documents pending approval by magistrate of further 
search.” See id. 
 75. Lowenstein, supra note 36, at 108. 
 76. See United States v. Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (“[Computer 
i]mages can be hidden in all manner of files, even word processing documents and spreadsheets. 
Criminals will do all they can to conceal contraband, including the simple expedient of changing 
the names and extensions of files to disguise their content from the casual observer.”); United 
States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 529 (E.D. Va. 1999) (“[H]ackers often intentionally mislabel 
files, or attempt to bury incriminating files within innocuously named directories.”). 
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invasive because they grant the government access to a much greater 
quantity and many more types of information about people’s private 
lives than do physical searches. 77 Most courts, however, have tried to 
strike a balance between these two extremes and have accordingly 
applied a number of different doctrines. 
Some courts have looked at the state of mind of the agent 
conducting the search. 78 In United States v. Carey, 79 for example, the 
Tenth Circuit held that a government detective exceeded a warrant’s 
scope when he admitted that after he opened one image file 
containing child pornography, he continued to look for child 
pornography rather than for the drug-related evidence listed in the 
warrant. 80 Accordingly, because the officer “knew” he was not going 
to find evidence related to drug activity yet continued to search 
outside the warrant’s scope, the court found that the officer 
conducted an unconstitutional general search. 81 
On the other hand, in United States v. Gray, 82 the court found 
that an FBI agent’s discovery of child pornography during a search 
for evidence of computer hacking did not exceed the warrant’s scope 
because the discovery was “inadvertent.” 83 
Courts are also divided in their application of the plain view 
doctrine to intermingled computer files. While some courts have held 
that a piece of evidence is not in plain view when a government 
agent must type commands in order to access a particular file, 84 
 
 77. Lowenstein, supra note 36, at 108–09 (citing United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 986 
(10th Cir. 2001) (“Because computers can hold so much information touching on many different 
areas of a person’s life, there is a greater potential for the ‘intermingling’ of documents and a 
consequent invasion of privacy when police execute a search for evidence on a computer.”)); 
Winick, supra note 49, at 105 (“[The] quantity and variety of information [on a computer] 
increases the likelihood that highly personal information, irrelevant to the subject of the lawful 
investigation, will also be searched or seized.”)). 
 78. Lowenstein, supra note 36, at 109. 
 79. 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 80. Id. at 1271. 
 81. Id. at 1274, 1276. 
 82. 78 F. Supp. 2d 524 (E.D. Va. 1999). 
 83. Id. at 529. 
 84. See, e.g., United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (Comprehensive Drug 
Testing I), 473 F.3d 915, 966–67 (9th Cir. 2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that computer 
evidence was not in plain view because locating such evidence “required analysis and thorough 
examination off-site”); United States v. Lemmons, 282 F.3d 920, 925 n.5 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding 
that officer’s testimony illustrated that images of child pornography were not in plain view 
because he “had to access them by opening a program and looking on the hard drive for 
pornographic images”). 
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others deem such evidence in plain view despite the intermediary 
step. 85 
Still another response to the problems presented by intermingled 
digital data is to require warrants to dictate ex ante the steps that a 
government agent must follow when searching a computer. 86 In 
Dalia v. United States, 87 however, the Supreme Court rejected the 
defendant’s argument that warrants must include “a specification of 
the precise manner in which they are to be executed.” 88 Because it is 
difficult to know what type of search is required until the agent 
actually sees the data, 89 the Court emphasized that “it is generally left 
to the discretion of the executing officers to determine the details of 
how best to proceed with the performance of a search authorized by 
warrant,” subject to a reasonableness standard. 90 
Finally, as will be explored shortly in the discussion about 
Comprehensive Drug Testing IV, some courts have adopted the 
Tamura court’s dicta and have found that the best way to avoid 
violating the Fourth Amendment is to seal the evidence pending 
magistrate review and to seek an additional warrant by specifying to 
the magistrate what types of files are sought. 91 While electronic 
search and seizure law presents more questions than answers, the 
Ninth Circuit’s Comprehensive Drug Testing IV decision is a 
compelling, though arguably flawed, attempt to create a new body of 
law that has profound ramifications for the government and for 
individual privacy. 
 
 85. See, e.g., United States v. Wong, 334 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that 
computer forensic expert’s discovery of child pornography was in plain view despite the 
warrant’s scope only covering evidence of murder because the warrant was valid and because the 
incriminating nature of the child pornography was “immediately apparent” under Horton v. 
California); Frasier v. State, 794 N.E.2d 449, 465–66 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the plain 
view exception still applied even though the government opened the digital file to see its contents 
because the file was ambiguously labeled, hence rendering the discovery of child pornography 
“inadvertent” under United States v. Carey). 
 86. Kerr, supra note 4, at 571. 
 87. 441 U.S. 238 (1979). 
 88. Id. at 257–59. 
 89. Kerr feels that the ex ante approach is deeply flawed because the forensics process is too 
“contingent and unpredictable” for judges to make effective rules. Kerr, supra note 4, at 572. 
 90. Dalia, 441 U.S. at 257. 
 91. United States v. Campos, 221 F.3d 1143, 1148 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Carey, 
172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Stierhoff, 477 F. Supp. 2d 423, 443 (D. 
R.I. 2007). 
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III.  UNITED STATES V. COMPREHENSIVE DRUG  
TESTING, INC. 
In Comprehensive Drug Testing IV, the Ninth Circuit considered 
many of the issues discussed above. Perhaps infamously, 
Comprehensive Drug Testing IV is about a federal investigation into 
professional baseball players’ steroid use. 92 As it pertains to this 
Note, however, Comprehensive Drug Testing IV is about the 
procedures that federal courts must follow when issuing and 
administering search warrants for electronically stored information. 93 
A.  Facts and Procedural History 
The present case came before the Ninth Circuit as a 
consolidation of three cases arising from the federal investigation of 
BALCO on suspicion that it had provided steroids to professional 
baseball players. 94 The government began the investigation in 
August 2002 and eventually developed probable cause that at least 
ten major league baseball players had received steroids from 
BALCO. 95 The same year, the Players Association entered into a 
collective bargaining agreement with MLB whereby players would 
be anonymously tested for steroid use in 2003. 96 According to the 
agreement, the purpose of the tests was only to determine the extent 
of the steroid problem in baseball; if more than 5 percent of players 
tested positive, further testing would be ordered in subsequent 
seasons. 97 The players were also promised confidentiality pursuant to 
the agreement. 98 
An independent business, Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. 
(CDT), administered the program from its Long Beach, California, 
facility and collected players’ urine samples. 99 However, a laboratory 
named Quest Diagnostics, Inc. (“Quest”) in Las Vegas, Nevada, 
 
 92. Comprehensive Drug Testing IV, 621 F.3d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 93. Id. at 1165–66. 
 94. Id. (citing United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (Comprehensive Drug 
Testing II), 513 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
 95. Id. (citing Comprehensive Drug Testing II, 513 F.3d at 1089). 
 96. Id. at 1166. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
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performed the actual tests. 100 While Quest kept the urine samples, 
CDT kept the list of players and their test results. 101 
1.  Central District of California and the Cooper Order 
On April 7, 2004, the Central District of California granted the 
government a warrant authorizing the search of CDT’s facilities. 102 
The warrant’s scope was limited to the records of the ten players as 
to whom the government had established probable cause. 103 
Nonetheless, on April 8, 2004, twelve federal agents, 104 led by 
Special Agent Jeff Novitzky, seized and reviewed the drug testing 
records 105 of hundreds of MLB and other professional athletes. 106 
Although the warrant granted broad authority to seize and remove 
nearly all computer equipment from CDT’s Long Beach, California, 
facility, it required that specially trained computer personnel—not 
the investigating agents—conduct the initial review and segregation 
of the data. 107 This requirement was meant to ensure that the 
investigating agents would not see data beyond the warrant’s 
scope. 108 Nonetheless, government agents went ahead and copied the 
Tracey Directory—which contained the names of hundreds of other 
athletes in addition to the ten baseball players that the warrant 
named—from the computers properly seized from CDT. 109 
Accordingly, Judge Florence-Marie Cooper found that the 
government “completely ignored” the warrant’s requirements. 110 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. (citing Comprehensive Drug Testing II, 513 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
 103. Id. 
 104. The twelve agents included a Computer Investigative Specialist Agent, Joseph Abboud. 
Comprehensive Drug Testing II, 513 F.3d at 1092. 
 105. CDT officials did not initially help Agent Novitzky find the evidence that the 
government was authorized to seize. Id. But, later that day, a CDT director identified a computer 
directory—the Tracey Directory—containing all of the computer files for all of CDT’s sports 
drug testing programs. Id. This directory contained hundreds of files and many subdirectories. Id. 
Pursuant to the warrant’s language, the agents copied the directory and removed the copy for 
review at government offices. Id. at 1093. Ultimately, the government seized a “25-page master 
list of all MLB players tested during the 2003 season and a 34-page list of positive drug test 
results for eight of the ten named BALCO players, intermingled with positive results from 26 
other players.” Id.  
 106. Id. at 1092. 
 107. Comprehensive Drug Testing IV, 621 F.3d at 1168. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 1169. 
 110. Id. at 1171. 
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In addition to ignoring the warrant’s requirements, the 
government also used the information it found during its 
impermissible review of the seized computer data to obtain the 
subsequent warrants issued in the Northern and Central Districts of 
California, as well as in Nevada. 111 Accordingly, Judge Cooper 
found that the government’s behavior demonstrated a “callous 
disregard for the rights of those persons whose records were seized 
and searched outside the warrant.” 112 Therefore, Judge Cooper 
concluded that the government’s failure to segregate responsive from 
nonresponsive data did not comply with the Tamura guidelines. She 
thereby issued an order (the “Cooper Order”) demanding the return 
to CDT of any evidence not connected with the ten players named in 
the warrant. 113 
2.  District of Nevada and the Mahan Order 
On the same day that federal agents searched CDT in the Central 
District of California, another group of federal agents seized 
specimens from Quest’s laboratory in the District of Nevada. 114 
Judge James Mahan issued an order (the “Mahan Order”) similar to 
the Cooper Order that the government had to return all specimens, as 
well as all notes and memoranda created by agents who reviewed the 
evidence except for that information pertaining to the ten BALCO 
players named in the original warrant. 115 
3.  Northern District of California and the Illston Quashal 
On May 6, 2004, the government secured grand jury subpoenas 
in the Northern District of California seeking from CDT the same 
records it had just seized pursuant to a warrant in the Central District, 
and which had just been ordered returned to CDT by Judge 
Cooper. 116 In December 2004, Judge Susan Yvonne Illston issued a 
 
 111. Id. at 1169. 
 112. Id. at 1169–70. 
 113. Id. at 1166 (referring to Order Granting Return of Property, United States v. 
Comprehensive Drug Testing, No. CV-04-02887-FMC (C.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2004)). 
 114. Id. at 1170; Comprehensive Drug Testing II, 513 F.3d 1085, 1093 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 115. Comprehensive Drug Testing IV, 621 F.3d at 1166–67; see also Comprehensive Drug 
Testing II, 513 F.3d at 1094 (referring to Order Granting Return of Property, United States v. 
Comprehensive Drug Testing, No. CV-04-00707-JCM (D. Nev. Aug. 19, 2004)). 
 116. Comprehensive Drug Testing IV, 621 F.3d at 1167; see also Comprehensive Drug 
Testing II, 513 F.3d at 1095 (listing the date that the government secured the grand jury 
subpoenas). 
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quashal of the subpoenas (the “Illston Quashal”), holding that the 
government’s conduct was unreasonable and constituted 
harassment. 117 
B.  The 2010 Ninth Circuit Decision 
The government subsequently appealed the three district court 
decisions to the Ninth Circuit. The three decisions were heard as one 
case by the same three-judge panel in 2006 and 2008, followed by an 
en banc panel in 2009. 118 
In the 2009 decision, Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, writing for the 
en banc majority, relied on issue preclusion 119 to affirm the Cooper 
Order, the Mahan Order and the Illston Quashal. He then 
interestingly—and controversially—concluded his opinion by 
issuing guidelines for magistrate judges to follow when the 
government wishes to obtain a warrant to examine an electronic 
storage medium or when a search for evidence could result in seizing 
a computer. 120 
Following the 2009 decision, then–Solicitor General Elena 
Kagan sought, for the first time in history, a rehearing by the full 
Ninth Circuit. 121 Kagan, on behalf of the Department of Justice, 
 
 117. Comprehensive Drug Testing IV, 621 F.3d at 1167 (referring to Order Quashing 
Subpoenas Seeking CDT Records, United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, No. MISC-04-
234-SI (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2004)); see also Comprehensive Drug Testing II, 513 F.3d at 1095 (listing 
the date that the Illston Quashal was issued). 
 118. In the Ninth Circuit, the term “en banc” refers to a panel of eleven judges consisting of 
the chief judge of the Ninth Circuit and ten additional judges to be drawn by lot from the active 
judges of the Ninth Circuit. 9TH CIR. R. 35-3. There are twenty-nine active judges on the Ninth 
Circuit. See History of the Federal Judiciary: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, FED. 
JUDICIAL CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/courts_coa_circuit_09.html (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2010). 
 119. Issue preclusion prevents a court from reconsidering an issue when “the first and second 
action involve application of the same principles of law to an [sic] historic fact setting that was 
complete by the time of the first adjudication.” Steen v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 106 
F.3d 904, 913 n.5 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting 18 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE 
& PROCEDURE § 4425 (Supp. 1996)). In other words, where, as here, the later-decided actions 
(the Mahan Order and Illston Quashal) involve the same facts and legal principles as the earlier-
decided action (the Cooper Order), the later-decided actions are bound by the factual and legal 
determinations of the earlier-decided action. 
 120. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (Comprehensive Drug Testing III), 
579 F.3d 989, 1006–07 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 121. Brief of United States, Petitioner-Appellant, in Support of Rehearing En Banc by the 
Full Court at 2, Comprehensive Drug Testing IV, 621 F.3d 1162 (Nos. 05-10067, 05-15006, 05-
55354) [hereinafter Brief]. The Ninth Circuit may order a rehearing by the all of the judges on the 
Ninth Circuit following a hearing or rehearing en banc. 9TH CIR. R. 35-3. 
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argued that the en banc panel’s guidelines exceeded an Article III 
court’s proper role. 122 
On September 13, 2010, rather than granting a rehearing by the 
full court, the same eleven-judge en banc panel reheard 
Comprehensive Drug Testing IV and issued a per curiam opinion that 
was identical to the 2009 opinion but with the guidelines relegated to 
a concurrence by Chief Judge Kozinski. 
1.  The Per Curiam Majority Affirms the Cooper Order and the 
Mahan Order 
Although the majority used issue preclusion to affirm the Mahan 
Order because it covered the same issues 123 as the  previously 
decided Cooper Order and Illston Quashal, the majority also 
addressed the government’s contrary arguments. 124 In doing so, the 
majority acknowledged that its decision could rest on issue 
preclusion, but it felt that the “matter [was] important” and necessary 
to discuss further in order to “avoid any quibble about the proper 
scope of preclusion.” 125 The majority discussed the government’s 
arguments regarding (1) Tamura and (2) the initial review by 
computer personnel. 126 The following sections discuss each in turn. 
a.  The government’s invocation of the plain view doctrine does not 
comply with the spirit of the Tamura procedures 
The government’s primary argument was that “it did comply 
with the procedures in Tamura,” but it was not obligated to return the 
data showing steroid use by non-BALCO players because the 
evidence was in “plain view” once the government agents searched 
 
 122. Brief, supra note 121, at 2. 
 123. The common issues were that the government “callously disregarded” the non-BALCO 
players’ constitutional rights, and that it “unreasonably refuse[d]” to follow the procedures set 
forth in Tamura upon learning that the ten BALCO players’ records were intermingled with the 
records of players not named in the warrants. Comprehensive Drug Testing IV, 621 F.3d at 1185. 
 124. Id. at 1170. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 1170–75. The majority also discussed CDT and the Players Association’s motions 
in the Central District of California and the District of Nevada for the return of property under 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g). Id. The government argues that plaintiffs improperly 
brought a Rule 41(g) motion as a motion to suppress. Id. at 1172. However, it is clear that 
plaintiffs did not intend their motion as a suppression motion because suppression motions only 
implicate criminal defendants. Id. Additionally, Rule 41(g) plainly authorizes a motion to return 
property on behalf of any “‘person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of property or by 
the deprivation of property.’” Id. at 1173 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(g)). 
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the Tracey Directory. 127 The government argued that Tamura did not 
apply because the seizure was then allegedly lawful. 128 
The majority, however, contended that while the government 
sought advance authorization for off-site sorting and seizure under 
Tamura, it violated the spirit of Tamura. 129 In particular, the majority 
noted that the point of the Tamura procedures was “to maintain the 
privacy of materials that are intermingled with seizable materials, 
and to avoid turning a limited search for particular information into a 
general search of office file systems and computer databases.” 130 The 
majority feared that allowing the government to look at every piece 
of seized electronic data will bring everything into “plain view,” thus 
expanding the scope of the search far beyond what was originally 
permitted by the warrant. 131 In other words, there would be no 
discernable limit to what the government could search and seize, 
rendering the procedural safeguards in Tamura worthless. 132 
b.  Initial review by computer personnel 
The majority found that the government ignored one of the main 
processes designed to prevent government access to intermingled 
materials beyond the scope of the warrant: initial review by 
“computer personnel.” 133 Despite the presence of an agent specially 
trained in computer forensics at the scene, the government agent 
assumed control over the Tracey Directory as soon as it was 
extracted from the CDT computers. 134 
The government adhered to the warrant specifications to the 
extent that the computer specialist determined that the data contained 
on the CDT computers could not be searched and segregated on-site 
and that it was safe to copy the Tracey Directory rather than seize the 
entire computer. 135 However, once the copy was made, the computer 
specialist did not take further steps to segregate the data contained in 
 
 127. Id. at 1170. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 1168–71. 
 130. Id. at 1170. 
 131. Id. at 1170–71. 
 132. Id. at 1171. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 1171–72. 
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the Tracey Directory. 136 Instead, the government proceeded, as it 
admitted at a hearing before Judge Mahan, “to take [the Tracey 
Directory] and later on briefly peruse it to see if there was anything 
above and beyond that which was authorized for seizure in the initial 
warrant.” 137 
Accordingly, the majority concluded that this admission 
“obvious[ly]” illustrated that the government agents intended the 
search to bring constitutionally protected data into the government 
agents’ plain view. 138 Furthermore, the majority dismissed as 
“sophistry” the government’s argument that the warrant did not 
specifically state that only computer personnel could view the seized 
files. 139 
2.  The Per Curiam Majority Affirms the Illston Quashal 
Judge Illston quashed the government’s subpoenas because the 
government served the subpoenas after it had learned from the 
Cooper Order that the same evidence had already been illegally 
seized. 140 Thus, Judge Illston found the subpoenas to be an 
“unreasonable ‘insurance policy’” 141 because it appeared that the 
government subpoenaed the same materials “in an attempt to moot 
any future proceedings for the return of property.” 142 
While the majority noted that it is not necessarily 
“unreasonable” to perform an investigation using both subpoenas and 
search warrants, 143 it held that when using investigatory tools such as 
warrants and subpoenas, the government must “fully disclose to each 
judicial officer prior efforts in other judicial fora to obtain same or 
related information, and what those efforts have achieved.” 144 The 
majority’s finding reflected its concern that the government’s 
 
 136. Id. at 1172. 
 137. Id. at 1171. 
 138. Id.  
 139. Id. at 1172. To prevent overreaching and the attendant accusations of pretext, Chief 
Judge Kozinski proposed, in what was the majority opinion in 2009 but is now a concurrence, a 
detailed protocol that will be discussed below in Part III.B.4. Id. at 1178–80. 
 140. Id. at 1175. 
 141. Id. (quoting United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, MISC-04-234-SI (N.D. Cal. 
Dec. 2004) (quashing subpoenas seeking CDT records) (filed under seal)). 
 142. Id. (comparing J.B. Manning Corp. v. United States, 86 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
 143. Id. (referring to In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated Dec. 10, 1987, 926 F.2d 847, 851–55 
(9th Cir. 1991)). 
 144. Id. 
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strategy of moving from district to district in pursuit of the same 
information intentionally misled the court. 145 
3.  The Per Curiam Majority Concludes by Updating  
Tamura and Suggesting Balance 
The majority ended its opinion by abruptly stating that it has 
“updated Tamura to apply to the daunting realities of electronic 
searches.” 146 However, the majority did not discuss the technicalities 
of how the government and judicial officers should handle this 
“update.” 
Furthermore, recognizing that over-seizing is inherent in the 
electronic, or digital, search process, the majority implored judicial 
officers to exercise “greater vigilance . . . in striking the right balance 
between the government’s interest in law enforcement and the right 
of individuals to be free from unreasonable search and seizures.” 147 
The majority again, however, did not suggest how this balance 
should be struck. 
4.  Chief Judge Kozinski’s Concurrence Provides Guidelines 
Designed to Ensure Lawful Electronic Search and Seizure 
Even though the majority did not delineate how judicial officers 
should balance the government’s and individuals’ interests, Chief 
Judge Kozinski offers guidelines to the public, the government, and 
the courts regarding how to conduct a lawful electronic search and 
seizure. 148 Kozinski emphasized that while judges must exercise their 
independent judgment, “heeding this guidance will significantly 
increase the likelihood that the searches and seizures of electronic 
storage that they authorize will be deemed reasonable and lawful.” 149 
Accordingly, in what was originally part of the 2009 majority 
opinion, Kozinski recommended that: (1) “magistrate judges should 
insist that the government waive reliance upon the plain view 
doctrine in digital evidence cases”; (2) “segregation and redaction 
must be done by specialized personnel[, and] if by government 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 1177. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 1178–80 (Kozinski, J., concurring). Judges Andrew Kleinfeld, W. Fletcher, 
Richard Paez, and Milan Smith joined Kozinski’s concurrence. 
 149. Id. at 1178. 
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computer personnel, the government must agree in the warrant 
application that the computer personnel will not disclose to the 
investigators any information other than that which is the target of 
the warrant”; (3) “warrants and subpoenas must disclose the actual 
risks of destruction of information as well as prior efforts to seize 
that information in other judicial fora”; (4) “[t]he government’s 
search protocol must be designed to uncover only the information for 
which it has probable cause, and only that information may be 
examined by the case agents”; and (5) “[t]he government must 
destroy or, if the recipient may lawfully possess it, return non-
responsive data, keeping the issuing magistrate informed about when 
it has done so and what it has kept.” 150 
V.  CRITIQUE OF EXISTING LAW 
The only difference between the 2009 en banc panel opinion and 
the 2010 per curiam rehearing is that the Ninth Circuit moved 
Kozinski’s guidelines from his majority opinion in 2009 to his 
concurrence in 2010. This curious maneuver is likely the Ninth 
Circuit’s peace offering to the Department of Justice and then–
Solicitor General Kagan. 151 Rather than grant the requested full court 
rehearing, the Ninth Circuit removed the Kozinski guidelines, which 
the Department of Justice argued were unconstitutionally advisory in 
violation of Article III, 152 and issued the 2010 opinion per curiam 
with Kozinski’s guidelines relegated to a concurrence. 153 
 
 150. Id. at 1179–80 (quoting Judge Kozinski’s majority opinion in Comprehensive Drug 
Testing III, 579 F.3d 989, 1006 (9th Cir. 2009)). 
 151. See Steven Kalar, Case o’ the Week: One Shy—Search Guidelines Fall in C.D.T., NINTH 
CIRCUIT BLOG (Sept. 19, 2010, 8:52 PM), http://circuit9.blogspot.com/search?q=comprehensive+ 
drug+testing. 
 152. 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 131 (2010) (“Absent constitutional or statutory 
authorization, a court has no power to render an advisory opinion. Thus, in most states, the courts 
will not give advisory opinions on constitutional or on any other kinds of issues not before the 
court as ‘cases’ or ‘controversies.’ Under the United States Constitution, the judicial power of the 
federal courts is restricted to ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’ Thus, federal courts are not authorized 
to issue advisory opinions under any circumstances.”). The 2009 guidelines were arguably an 
advisory opinion because the issues in the case were already decided pursuant to issue preclusion. 
Yet, the 2009 majority still issued its guidelines to govern future behavior. 
 153. See Kalar, supra note 151. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit may have avoided Supreme 
Court review by moving the controversial “guidelines” into a concurrence. Lee Tien, Revised 
Opinion in Privacy Case Blurs Clear Limits to Digital Search and Seizure, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 14, 2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/09/revised-opinion-
privacy-case-blurs-clear-limits. 
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A.  While Avoiding the Advisory Opinion Label, the 2010 Guidelines 
Will Still “Advise” Future Legal Actors 
Even though Kozinski’s guidelines are no longer binding Ninth 
Circuit law, and the opinion is thus no longer susceptible to being a 
true advisory opinion, the guidelines will likely have the same effect 
because they will still “advise” future legal actors’ actions. 
Particularly because the 2010 per curiam opinion did not explain how 
judicial officers should apply the updated Tamura procedures to 
electronic searches and seizures or how they should strike the “right 
balance” between the government’s and individuals’ interests, it is 
likely that judicial officers and the government will look to 
Kozinski’s concurrence for guidance. 154 Without clear rules in the 
per curiam opinion and with the assurance that “heeding [Kozinski’s 
guidelines] will significantly increase the likelihood that searches 
and seizures of electronic storage . . . will be lawful,” the government 
and judicial officers will be tempted to follow Kozinski’s 
guidelines. 155 And, as illustrated by the twenty times that the non-
binding Tamura procedures have been cited by federal courts, the 
government and judicial officers would be foolish not to. 156 
B.  The 2010 Guidelines Do All the Damage of an  
Advisory Opinion with None of the Liability 
Even though Kozinski’s guidelines cannot technically constitute 
an advisory opinion because they are no longer binding on the court, 
they do all the damage of an advisory opinion with none of the 
liability. The danger of an advisory opinion is that it will be afforded 
the force of a holding despite being unrelated to a case or 
controversy before the court. 157 
For example, an unfortunate byproduct of Kozinski’s 2009 
guidelines was that magistrates were “treating the en banc panel’s 
‘guidance’ as binding.” 158 Indeed, after the 2009 opinion, the “Chief 
 
 154. Kalar, supra note 151. 
 155. Comprehensive Drug Testing IV, 621 F.3d at 1178 (Kozinski, J., concurring). 
 156. See Westlaw KeyCite Result, WESTLAW, http://www.westlaw.com (search for citation 
“694 F.2d 591,” click “KeyCite Citing References for this Headnote” for Headnote “[3]”, check 
the box next to “Cases [22],” and click “Go”). 
 157. See United States v. Alaska S.S. Co., 253 U.S. 113, 116 (1920) (explaining that a court is 
not empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions that are not germane to the 
issues of the case). 
 158. Brief, supra note 121, at 5. 
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Magistrate Judge for the Western District of Washington . . . sent the 
United States Attorney’s Office for that district a letter stating that 
‘we are all required to follow the requirements set forth in the [2009 
en banc majority]’s decision.’” 159 
Additionally, the treatment of the 2009 guidelines as binding 
created hardships for U.S. Attorney’s Offices because federal agents 
had difficulty executing warrants, and forensic examiners trying to 
adhere to the guidelines spent much more time learning complex 
cases before sorting intermingled documents. 160 Put differently, the 
2009 guidelines chilled magistrates from deviating from the 
guidelines and chilled the government from seeking new warrants. 
The 2009 guidelines also caused the federal government to 
transfer its investigations to state authorities who were not 
constrained by the guidelines. 161 For example, when federal agents in 
the Western District of Washington heard from their colleagues in 
San Diego that two people had filmed themselves raping a four-year-
old girl and sent the images over the Internet, the agents did not 
apply for a warrant to search the suspects’ computers because the 
2009 guidelines insisted that the government “waive reliance on the 
plain view doctrine in digital evidence cases.” 162 The agents were 
thus afraid that any evidence that the forensic experts found on the 
suspects’ computers pertaining to other potential victims could not 
be revealed because the 2009 guidelines prohibited forensic experts 
from revealing anything to the FBI beyond the warrant’s scope. 163 
Rather than risk discovering other potential victims and not being 
able to use the evidence, the federal agents opted to transfer the case 
to state officials. 164 
Legal actors’ troublesome reliance on the 2009 advisory 
guidelines will not dissipate now that Kozinski’s concurrence 
contains the guidelines. While magistrates and the government need 
not follow Kozinski’s 2010 guidelines, they will likely continue to 
 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 6. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Comprehensive Drug Testing III, 579 F.3d 989, 1006 (9th Cir. 2009); Brief, supra note 
121, at 6–7. 
 163. Brief, supra note 121, at 6–7. 
 164. This shifting between federal and state jurisdictions raises an interesting federalism issue 
that will be discussed in Part V. 
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follow his advice in the absence of clear rules in the 2010 majority 
opinion. When the chief judge speaks, even if in a concurrence, 
people listen. In other words, by putting his guidelines in a 
nonbinding concurrence that cannot be considered an advisory 
opinion with a capital “A,” Kozinski had his cake and ate it too. 
C.  Alternatives to Moving the Guidelines into a Concurrence 
Other than transferring Kozinski’s guidelines to a concurrence—
an arguable end run around the advisory opinion problem—what else 
could the Ninth Circuit have done? In many ways, Comprehensive 
Drug Testing IV was not a good test case to formulate a coherent set 
of rules governing intermingled documents stored on computers. 
To start, jurisdictions are already split as to the applicability of 
the plain view doctrine, the agent’s state of mind as an indicator of 
an unconstitutionally broad search, and the application of the Tamura 
procedures in the digital realm. 165 While the plain view doctrine 
works well as traditionally understood in the confined physical 
spaces of homes, cars, and file cabinets, it raises more privacy 
concerns in the vast digital storage spaces of hard drives, floppy 
disks, and thumb drives. 
Similarly, sorting intermingled physical documents under 
Tamura does not require the same degree of technical skill that 
sorting intermingled digital data entails. Indeed, the danger of digital 
booby traps and the reality of encryption are dilemmas unique to 
searching and sorting digital information. Therefore, the attenuated 
analogy between physical and digital information renders Kozinski’s 
attempt to create new plain view rules and the majority’s attempt to 
apply Tamura to computer searches and seizures fragmented at best, 
and an end run at worst. 
Second, the issues in Comprehensive Drug Testing IV were not a 
good foundation on which to build new digital search and seizure 
law because they were primarily procedural. 166 It was not until after 
 
 165. See supra Part II.D.1–2. 
 166. The Ninth Circuit ruled on the following issues: (1) whether the appeal of the Cooper 
Order was timely filed; (2) whether the appeal of the Mahan Order was controlled by the 
preclusive effect of the Cooper and Illston Orders; (3) whether the government complied with the 
terms of certain warrants; (4) whether the District Court for the District of Nevada abused its 
discretion in ordering property returned to the appellees pursuant to Rule 41(g); and (5) whether 
the District Court for the Northern District of California abused its discretion in concluding that 
compliance with a particular subpoena would be “unreasonable or oppressive.” Comprehensive 
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ruling for CDT and the Players Association on the merits of these 
issues that Kozinski issued the digital search and seizure guidelines 
that “should prove a useful tool for the future.” 167 
In Comprehensive Drug Testing IV, the resolution of the 
dispositive issues was judicially sound, and the Ninth Circuit issued 
an order decreeing that it would not consider any further petitions for 
rehearing. 168 Thus, the Ninth Circuit will likely have to wait for a 
case that has the guidelines as its central issue until it can create a 
new body of digital search and seizure law. 
D.  The 2010 Guidelines Could Still Become Binding Precedent If 
They Become an Issue Before a Different Set of Ninth Circuit Judges 
In fact, even though the guidelines are in a concurrence, a 
different Ninth Circuit panel of judges or a case that features the 
guidelines as the dispositive issue could result in the guidelines 
becoming controlling precedent yet again. 169 It is noteworthy that the 
technologically savvy Judge Sidney Thomas was not involved in 
either the 2009 or 2010 Comprehensive Drug Testing IV opinions. 170 
Judge Thomas’s dissent in the 2006 panel decision sparked the 
ensuing Ninth Circuit debate because he suggested that the computer 
evidence had not been in plain view. 171 Had Judge Thomas been one 
of the eleven judges on the 2010 panel, or had one of Judges 
Wardlaw, Berzon, or Graber remained loyal to Kozinski’s 
guidelines, the guidelines might still be in the majority opinion. 172 
V.  PROPOSAL 
When framing a solution to digital searches and seizures—or 
any issue for that matter—one of the first steps is to determine what 
is and whose interests are at stake. In Comprehensive Drug Testing 
IV, the government, magistrates, and athletes whose drug-testing 
information was seized in the Tracey Directory clearly had a strong 
 
Drug Testing IV, 621 F.3d 1162, 1167, 1170–72, 1174–75 (9th Cir. 2010); Brief, supra note 121, 
at 3–4. 
 167. Comprehensive Drug Testing IV, 621 F.3d at 1180 (Kozinski, J., concurring). 
 168. Id. at 1165 (majority opinion). 
 169. Kalar, supra note 151. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Comprehensive Drug Testing I, 473 F.3d 915, 966–67 (9th Cir. 2006) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
 172. Kalar, supra note 151. 
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interest in the outcome of the case. Beyond Comprehensive Drug 
Testing IV, however, millions of ordinary individuals whose personal 
information might be intermingled with data targeted by a warrant 
are left without a reasonable expectation of privacy. It is this concern 
for innocent third-party privacy that frames this Note’s proposal. 
A.  A Legislative Solution Federalizes Privacy Expectation and  
Best Accounts for the Fundamental Differences Between  
Physical and Digital Data 
Courts are traditionally viewed as the guardians of individual 
privacy: they “can expose constitutional, statutory, and common law 
privacy gaps and identify the constitutional standards to which 
legislation must conform.” 173 A judicial solution, then, seems logical. 
However, because Comprehensive Drug Testing IV has left more 
questions than answers, and because jurisdictions are split over the 
proper application of search and seizure doctrine to intermingled 
digital data, the permanent solution is legislative. 
As Professor Patricia Bellia states in her recent law review 
article Federalization in Information Privacy Law, “some of our 
most significant federal information privacy statutes attempt to 
implement or recalibrate the balance that courts have arrived at in 
applying the Fourth Amendment to the conduct of government 
agents.” 174 Congress does this under its Commerce Clause power. 175 
Specifically, where, as in Comprehensive Drug Testing IV, a court 
has applied the Fourth Amendment to government conduct affecting 
information privacy, the Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the 
Commerce Clause 176 “[to] give[] Congress considerable leeway to 
 
 173. Patricia Bellia, Federalization in Information Privacy Law, 118 YALE L.J. 868, 878 
(2009). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (explaining that the Supreme Court 
has firmly established Congress’s power to regulate local, non-commercial activities if, in the 
aggregate, the activities have a substantial effect on interstate commerce); Wickard v. Filburn, 
317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942) (finding that a farmer’s growth of wheat for personal consumption 
in excess of the quota imposed by the Agricultural Act can be regulated under the Act because of 
its potentially substantial impact in the aggregate). Furthermore, the scope of certain privacy 
statutes has been explicitly linked to interstate commerce. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (2006) 
(defining “wire communication” as a transmission in interstate commerce or one that affects 
interstate commerce); 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(4) (2006) (defining “video tape service provider” as 
any person engaged in business in or affecting interstate commerce); 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(a), (b) 
(2006) (regulating government officials’ search and seizure of work product and other documents 
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respond by implementing or ratcheting up the judicial standard.” 177 
Under this interpretation, the Commerce Clause gives Congress the 
power to create statutes that reinforce or overcome judicial opinions 
to conform to Congress’s ideal balance of individual privacy and law 
enforcement capability. 178 Because the legislature creates laws that 
represent the culmination of judicial wrestling with constitutional 
issues, Bellia calls this nexus a “quasi-constitutional form of criminal 
procedure.” 179 
An example of this quasi-constitutional machinery at work is 
exemplified by the enactment of the Federal Wiretap Act 180 in 
response to the Supreme Court’s 1967 decisions in Katz v. United 
States 181 and Berger v. New York. 182 In Berger, the Court struck 
down a New York statute that permitted eavesdropping on private 
citizens by local law enforcement officials. 183 Similarly, in Katz, the 
Court found that FBI agents’ use of an electronic listening and 
recording device to overhear a suspect’s conversation in a public 
telephone booth constituted a Fourth Amendment “search” 184 and 
thus required a warrant. 185 
Both Berger and Katz forbade eavesdropping by government 
officials unless the officials complied with the Fourth Amendment 
requirements that the Court identified. 186 In 1968, the year following 
the Berger and Katz decisions, Congress enacted the Federal Wiretap 
Act, codifying the steps government officials must take to obtain a 
warrant authorizing electronic surveillance. 187 
 
relating to material possessed by a person reasonably believed to intend to disseminate the 
materials “in or affecting interstate . . . commerce”). 
 177. Bellia, supra note 173, at 878. 
 178. Id. at 878–79. 
 179. Id. at 879. 
 180. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, 82 
Stat. 197, 211 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2006)). 
 181. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 182. 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Bellia, supra note 173, at 879. 
 183. Berger, 388 U.S. at 41–42, 63–64. 
 184. Katz, 389 U.S. at 359. 
 185. Id. at 347. 
 186. Bellia, supra note 173, at 879. 
 187. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2006); see United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679, 687 (10th Cir. 1971) 
(explaining that Congress made “[e]very effort” to comply with the requirements of Berger and 
Katz in enacting the Federal Wiretap Act and that Congress was “seeking to deal realistically with 
highly complex problems in accordance with the demands of the Constitution”); Bellia, supra 
note 173, at 879. 
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Whether or not Comprehensive Drug Testing IV stays on the 
books, a legislative solution would enable Congress to federalize 
digital privacy expectations. Legislation protecting privacy in the 
digital arena is particularly necessary because it is difficult to place a 
value on the damaging societal effects of the release of personal 
data. 188 For example, the names of MLB players whose records were 
intermingled with the ten players’ records that the government had a 
warrant to seize have begun to publically leak. 189 One player whose 
name has leaked, David Ortiz of the Boston Red Sox, has admitted 
that the “scandal has affected his recent performance on the field.” 190 
The shame, public condemnation, and loss of goodwill that the 
revelation has had on Ortiz are difficult to translate into monetary 
terms. 
While it might be difficult to sympathize with the plight of a 
multi-millionaire professional athlete, it is important to remember 
that the athletes whose records were seized in the Tracey Directory 
were promised anonymity by the government as a precondition of 
submitting to the drug tests. The athletes’ expectation of privacy, 
therefore, is no different than that of the ordinary citizen who expects 
his or her sensitive medical or bank records to remain confidential. 
Legislating in this area will enable Congress to articulate its stance 
on an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy should private 
information become intermingled with the target of a valid digital 
search and seizure. 
Congress also has a strong interest in safeguarding the economic 
well-being of the innocent third parties whose data is intermingled 
with the targeted information. In Comprehensive Drug Testing IV, 
the majority explained that the government has to return the property 
to “protect[] the privacy and economic well-being of [the players], 
which could easily be impaired if the government were to release the 
test results swept up in the dragnet.” 191 
 
 188. See James Nehf, Recognizing the Social Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. 
REV. 1, 62–64 (2003). 
 189. Eric Polsky, Every Thorn Has Its Rose, BASEBALL DAILY DIG. (Aug. 12, 2009, 12:12 
AM), http://www.baseballdailydigest.com/2009/08/12/every-thorn-has-its-rose/. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Comprehensive Drug Testing IV, 621 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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A legislative solution also has many precedents; Congress has 
historically acted in reaction to highly publicized privacy breaches. 192 
For example, in 1988, Congress passed the Video Privacy Protection 
Act (VPPA) 193 in response to the publication of Judge Robert Bork’s 
video rental history during his failed Supreme Court nomination 
hearing. The Senate report accompanying the proposed legislation 
linked the media coverage of Judge Bork’s video rental history to the 
need for VPPA. 194 
Likewise, Congress should both explicate its position on the 
reasonable expectation of privacy and act in response to the highly 
publicized leak of the names of MLB players who have tested 
positive for steroids. As was the case with VPPA, the prior 
publication of a major investigative report would bolster any new 
legislation in light of Comprehensive Drug Testing IV. After the 
results of the anonymous drug testing referenced in Comprehensive 
Drug Testing IV revealed the prevalence of steroid use in major 
league baseball, former Senator George Mitchell undertook a twenty-
month-long investigation. That investigation culminated in the 
publication of the 409-page Mitchell Report that listed the names of 
eighty-nine players who allegedly used steroids and made 
recommendations on how to resolve baseball’s steroid problem. 195 
The explosive publicity that accompanied the leak of the innocent 
players’ names along with the existence of a major investigative 
report gives Congress additional compelling reasons to create laws 
governing intermingled digital information. 
B.  The Composition of a New Digital Statute 
The composition of any statute Congress might enact in 
response to the publicity, the Mitchell Report, and Comprehensive 
Drug Testing IV will depend in part on whether the U.S. Supreme 
Court rehears Comprehensive Drug Testing IV. Even if the Court 
rehears Comprehensive Drug Testing IV, however, the law still will 
 
 192. Bellia, supra note 173, at 884. 
 193. Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 3195 (codified at 
18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006)). 
 194. S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 4–5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4342-1, 4342-5. 
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not sufficiently address the fact that digital evidence is 
fundamentally different from physical evidence because judicial 
decisions are bound by stare decisis. It will then force the Supreme 
Court to create law based on the existing plain view rules, rather than 
create new law from scratch like Congress can. While a Supreme 
Court opinion could provide a temporary solution to the digital 
evidence problem, the permanent solution is legislative. In the 
meantime, I have an advisory opinion of my own. 
First, any new statute (or any common law development, for that 
matter) must be framed by the policy that law enforcement abuse is 
the exception rather than the norm. While case law is littered with 
examples of government agents, such as those in Carey and 
Comprehensive Drug Testing IV, who “callously disregarded” 
individual rights or “indiscriminately fished” for information beyond 
a warrant’s scope, “there is no evidence that police disobedience of 
search warrant limitations is so widespread to compel such onerous 
pre-issuance procedures.” 196 This is but one reason why the new 
statute should purge Kozinski’s suggestion that the government 
waive reliance on the plain view doctrine. 
Second, the legislature must provide law enforcement with a 
seizure device—similar to the plain view doctrine—that accounts for 
the major differences between physical and digital searches. Not only 
does the exponential difference in storage capacity between physical 
and digital storage media exacerbate the already “inconvenient” 
process of returning to the magistrate for a new warrant, but seeing 
contraband in plain view on a bedside table is inherently different 
from opening file folders on a hard drive and seeing a JPEG of child 
pornography. 197 Therefore, even though trying to judicially 
reconfigure the plain view doctrine to fit digital evidence cases could 
be an adequate temporary fix, a legislative solution will best be able 
to account, anew, for the vast differences between digital and 
physical searches. 
 
 196. United States v. Farlow, No. CR-09-38-B-W, 2009 WL 4728690, at *6 n.3 (D. Me. 
Dec. 3, 2009). That a judge from the U.S. District Court of the District of Maine would drop a 
footnote expressing displeasure with the 2009 Comprehensive Drug Testing III guidelines is 
telling of the shockwaves that the guidelines have sent throughout the United States. This issue is 
not confined to the Ninth Circuit. 
 197. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 327 (1987) (discussing the practical justifications of 
permitting a police officer to seize contraband viewed in the course of a lawful arrest); supra Part 
II.D.1. 
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As mentioned in Part II.D.1, Kerr draws a distinction between 
seizing evidence subject and not subject to human observation (e.g., 
an officer’s handwritten notes versus an officer’s copy of an entire 
computer directory created without actually seeing the directory’s 
contents) by suggesting that the former is not an unlawful seizure 
while the latter is. 198 But most electronic copies are created without 
the copier actually observing the entire file—the sheer size of digital 
files making such a practice inefficient and unwieldy. 199 Therefore, a 
statutory provision similar to the plain view doctrine will be 
necessary to avoid unlawfully seizing copied electronic data. 
Furthermore, a statute similar to the plain view doctrine but 
tailored to digital evidence cases fits within the original policy aim of 
preventing data destruction. Prior to Kerr’s suggestion that the 
“power to seize is the power to freeze,” 200 the strongest argument 
against a digital plain view doctrine was that copying data eliminates 
the risk of data destruction. However, if courts adopt Kerr’s 
distinction, the government will not copy digital data for fear of 
violating the Fourth Amendment. Rather, the government will likely 
revert to Tamura’s and Kozinski’s suggestion to return to the 
magistrate for a new warrant. What once seemed like a good idea to 
Kozinski could ultimately provide a window for suspects to encrypt 
and destroy digital data. 
1.  Digital Plain View 
Whether the final arbiter of the digital plain view doctrine 
debate is the courts or the legislature, it is clear that such a doctrine 
must be clearly distinguished from Tamura and the file-cabinet 
analogue. The differences in file types, file sizes, and infrastructure 
between computers and physical spaces are fundamental. Digital 
plain view should build on the requirements of Horton and adjust 
those requirements to the information stored on computers. 
 
 198. Kerr, supra note 44, at 714. 
 199. See id. at 715. 
 200. This clever phrase means that copying data is an unlawful seizure because copying data 
is like “freezing” data for the government’s later use without the government having first 
observed the data at the scene. Copying as freezing is distinguishable from copying in the form of 
photographs or written notes because photographs and written notes are first observed before the 
copy is made, implying that their use is more akin to refreshing one’s memory than adding to 
evidence that one might not have obtained otherwise. See id. at 711–12. 
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Specifically, digital plain view should keep the requirement that 
the officer must not have violated the Fourth Amendment in arriving 
at the place from which the evidence can be plainly viewed. While in 
Horton this meant that the officer had a valid warrant to enter the 
home, in the digital context this should be amended to mean both 
that the officer received a valid warrant to search the computer and 
that a forensics expert does the actual searching. If encryption and 
data destruction are as onerous of problems as the government 
maintains, it makes sense that an expert do the digging. 
In addition, Kozinski’s suggestion that the expert not reveal to 
the FBI any evidence found outside the warrant’s scope should not 
be incorporated into the legislation. Forensic experts are computer 
experts, not trained law enforcement officers. As such, they are not 
in the best position to know whether a piece of evidence is validly 
within plain view. What they do know, however, is how to navigate 
though the different types of files and how to efficiently and safely 
locate the desired information. 
Additionally, in order to comply with adding the forensics 
expert to the digital search, the Horton requirement that the officer 
must have a lawful right to seize the object itself should be amended 
so that the forensics expert is the one who needs to confine his or her 
search to the warrant’s confines. With the advent of digital plain 
view in the wake of Comprehensive Drug Testing IV, what 
constitutes the warrant’s confines must also be determined. 
At this juncture, case law is not developed enough to speculate 
on how specific a warrant must be to comply with the Fourth 
Amendment in the digital realm. In fact, the notes accompanying the 
December 2009 amendment to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
§ 41(e) specify that while the amended rule includes new provisions 
tailored to electronic searches and seizures, the decision as to the 
warrant’s specificity must be left to “ongoing case law 
development.” 201 When the time comes, the Supreme Court should 
consider carving out an exception for intermingled documents 
because of the ease with which documents outside a warrant’s scope 
can get swept up with documents within its scope. 
Finally, the Horton requirement that the evidence’s 
incriminating nature must be “immediately apparent” must be further 
 
 201. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e) advisory committee’s note. 
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explicated to cover information stored on computers. As Supreme 
Court precedent currently stands, the term “immediately apparent” 
does not imply an “unduly high degree of certainty as to the 
incriminatory character of the evidence . . . .” 202 Instead, many courts 
have held that satisfying the “immediately apparent” prong requires 
only that the government agents have probable cause 203 to believe 
that the object they are viewing is evidence of a crime. 204 Still, 
neither the Supreme Court nor any of the Courts of Appeals have 
issued opinions explaining how or whether digitally stored 
information alters the meaning of “immediately apparent.” 205 
Because digitally and physically stored information differ in 
irreconcilable ways, I propose that “immediately apparent” digital 
information include information discovered during a two-tiered 
logical and physical search by a forensic expert. If there is probable 
cause that a computer contains child pornography and an expert 
discovers such files during his two-tiered search, such data should be 
considered “immediately apparent.” 
Unlike opening a drawer or physical file, performing logical and 
physical searches exposes more of a suspect’s information to the 
searcher. However, the amount and complexity of digital 
information, as well as a suspect’s ability to hide, encrypt, or booby-
 
 202. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 741 (1983). 
 203. The Supreme Court has frequently explained that “probable cause is a flexible, common-
sense standard [that] merely requires that the facts available to the officer would ‘warrant a man 
of reasonable caution in the belief that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or 
useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or 
more likely true than false.” Id. at 742. 
 204. Id. at 741–42; see also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987) (holding that 
probable cause is required to invoke the plain view doctrine but not specifically stating that 
probable cause is required to satisfy the “immediately apparent” prong); United States v. Smith, 
459 F.3d 1276, 1290–91 (11th Cir. 2006) (stating that meeting the “immediately apparent” prong 
requires probable cause to believe that the objects the agents are viewing is evidence of a crime 
but not specifying whether that is the only requirement). 
 205. A search of district court opinions revealed one case that offered guidance as to what 
constitutes “immediately apparent” digital evidence. In United States v. Mitchell, the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of Georgia held that images of child pornography on the suspect’s 
hard drive were immediately apparent because the suspect answered, “Yes, probably” to a 
question as to whether his computer contained child pornography. CR407-126, 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 74349, at *16 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 3, 2007). The unequivocal language of the suspect, 
combined with the FBI’s prior knowledge that the suspect had purchased something from an 
illegal website “clearly furnished probable cause” that the suspect’s computer contained images 
of child pornography. Id. at *16–17. While this case was factually about data on electronic 
storage devices, the court nonetheless defined “immediately apparent” as that which meets 
probable cause. 
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trap data, necessitates the depth and breadth of a logical and physical 
search. What might be found during such a search, then, must 
properly be considered “immediately apparent” under the new digital 
plain view doctrine. 
Because I propose that the statute not include Kozinski’s 
suggestion that the forensic expert not reveal information outside the 
warrant’s scope to the FBI, the risk of the forensic expert missing 
evidence validly within plain view is mitigated. For example, in 
Comprehensive Drug Testing IV, the government might not have 
seized the entire Tracey Directory if a rule existed that permitted the 
forensic expert to reveal potentially incriminating evidence to the 
government for the government to then decide whether to apply for a 
new warrant or to seize the evidence as “immediately apparent” 
under plain view. 
For all of this to work, however, mechanisms must be put in 
place to enforce the one-way investigative wall between the forensic 
expert and the government. While the expert is permitted to reveal 
potentially incriminating evidence to the government under the 
proposed law, nothing legally prevents the government from looking 
over the expert’s shoulder—from silently yet effectively usurping the 
process. This is a perceived weakness of the new statute but an issue 
for another paper. A piece of legislation encompassing the 
aforementioned provisions and addressing the practical necessity of 
an investigative wall strikes the best balance “between the 
government’s interest in law enforcement and the right of individuals 
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” 206 
2.  A Uniform Federal Law Is Consistent with Federalism 
Furthermore, creating a uniform federal law will best serve the 
interests of federalism by preventing law enforcement duties from 
being transferred from federal to state governments. As previously 
discussed, federal agents operating under the 2009 guidelines handed 
their duties to the states rather than ignore potentially incriminating 
information due to the forensic experts’ inability to divulge 
information outside a warrant’s scope. Without clear rules in the 
2010 majority opinion, and with Kozinski’s conspicuous notification 
that following his 2010 guidelines will “significantly increase the 
 
 206. Comprehensive Drug Testing IV, 621 F.3d 1162, 1177 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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likelihood” that searches and seizures “will be deemed reasonable 
and lawful,” federal agents will likely turn to Kozinski’s concurrence 
for the same guidance that caused them to transfer cases to state 
governments prior to the 2010 decision. 207 The lack of clear federal 
law will thus place a greater law enforcement burden on state 
governments. 
The creation of clear federal law also may lead to new state law 
in this area. Bellia points out, “As in the case of quasi-constitutional 
statutes, when Congress fills a perceived information privacy gap 
before states do and Congress does not preempt state legislation, 
states can adopt their own laws regulating similar conduct.” 208 This 
situation is significant due to a phenomenon called “competitive 
federalism.” 209 Competitive federalism occurs when states enact 
laws—digital search and seizure laws, for example—and people or 
businesses move to the state they perceive to have the most favorable 
laws. 210 The states essentially compete for residents and businesses. 
Because states have an incentive to attract residents and businesses, 
they will theoretically create laws that favor individual privacy over 
government law enforcement. Therefore, not only will creating a 
clear federal law prevent cases from being transferred to the states, it 
will also prompt the states to enact laws favorable to the people. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Comprehensive Drug Testing IV opinion, while particularly 
interesting to baseball aficionados, is universally compelling because 
it implicates several pressing issues at the forefront of digital search 
and seizure doctrine. Specifically, whether in the 2009 majority 
opinion or the 2010 concurring opinion, the suggestion that the plain 
view doctrine should not apply to digital evidence cases overlooks 
the fundamental differences in file size, time needed to search, and 
possibility of data destruction inherent in digital evidence as 
compared to the physical evidence discussed in Tamura. Rather than 
leaving the government and judicial officers to figure out how the 
plain view doctrine explicated in the 1982 Tamura case applies to the 
 
 207. Id. at 1178 (Kozinski, J., concurring). 
 208. Bellia, supra note 173, at 883–85 (calling the phenomenon the “Federal-First” regulatory 
response). 
 209. Id. at 876–77. 
 210. Id. 
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computer realm, as suggested by the 2010 majority, the legislature 
should decide how the plain view doctrine—or a similar exception to 
the warrant requirement—applies to intermingled digital documents. 
The legislature’s best shot at a workable digital plain view 
doctrine is to reconfigure Horton to incorporate Kozinski’s 
suggestion that a forensic expert perform the search. However, the 
legislation should not include Kozinski’s guideline suggesting that 
the expert not reveal anything outside the warrant’s scope to the 
government officials. This configuration protects individual privacy 
by removing the government agents from the searcher role, yet 
assures the government that it will not miss any new victims or 
evidence solely because the expert cannot reveal information outside 
the warrant’s scope. 
In addition to its ability to reconfigure the plain view doctrine 
without the confines of stare decisis, the legislature can also honor 
the principles of federalism by creating a uniform federal law. The 
fact that federal agents are transferring cases to state agencies for 
fear of running afoul of Kozinski’s guidelines in Comprehensive 
Drug Testing IV is troubling—troubling for underfunded government 
agencies and troubling for the principles of federalism. Ultimately, 
the legislature should act because it will best serve the interests of the 
citizenry by catalyzing competitive federalism. Not only will the 
American people have a clearly defined federal digital search and 
seizure law but also the choice to move to states with laws that favor 
individual privacy. 
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